Future Foreign Minister James Byrnes, who was in Yalta, wrote in his memoirs that «as far as I can see, the president has taken little preparation for the conference.» Lord Moran, Churchill`s physician, said the president was a «very sick man» who had only a few months to live. Churchill should complain about moran: «The president is behaving very badly. Charles Chip Bohlen of the US State Department, who played the role of Russian interpreter of the FDR, felt that each of the «big three» had achieved its main objectives in Yalta, but acknowledged that there was «a sense of frustration and some bitterness towards Poland». For U.S. and British professional diplomats such as Bohlen, the Yalta agreements seemed superficial «realistic compromises between the different positions of each country.» Stalin had made a real concession by finally accepting a French area in Germany, while Churchill and Roosevelt had talked a lot about Poland. But even then, Mr Bohlen thought that the plan, as it was finally agreed, would have led to a truly democratic Polish government if it had been implemented. Bohlen`s friend at the State Department, George Kennan, was not so optimistic. In a memorandum written just before Yalta, Kennan made a bleak and forward-looking assessment of future Soviet relations with the West. He saw no hope of cooperation with Stalin in a post-war Europe, but an «inevitable conflict between the allied need for stable and independent nations in Europe and a Soviet advance to the West.» In a very short time, Stalin refused to do his bargain against Poland, not respecting the declaration on liberated Europe.
And only a year and a month after Yalta, on March 5, 1946, Churchill delivered his famous «Iron Curtain» speech in Fulton, Missouri. «It is not so difficult to maintain unity in times of war, because there is a common goal of defeating the common enemy, which is clear to everyone. The difficult task will come after the war, when different interests tend to divide the allies. It is our duty to see that our relations are as strong in peacetime as they are in times of war. On March 1, Roosevelt assured Congress: «I come from Crimea with the firm conviction that we have begun on the road to a world of peace.  However, the Western powers soon realized that Stalin would not keep his promise of free elections for Poland. After receiving considerable criticism in London after Yalta of the atrocities committed by Soviet troops in Poland, Churchill wrote a desperate letter to Roosevelt in which he referred to the large-scale deportations and liquidations of opposition Poles by the Soviets.  On March 11, Roosevelt replied to Churchill and wrote, «I am sure we must stand firm on a correct interpretation of Crimea`s decision. They rightly believe that neither the government nor the people of this country will support participation in fraud or mere deception by the Lublin government, and the solution must be as we imagined it in Yalta.  But as his troops occupied much of Germany and Eastern Europe, Stalin succeeded in effectively ratifying the concessions he won at Yalta and in pressuring his advance on Truman and Churchill (replaced in the middle of the conference by Prime Minister Clement Atlee). In March 1946, barely a year after the Yalta Conference, Churchill delivered his famous speech in which he declared that an «iron curtain» had fallen on Eastern Europe, marking the definitive end of cooperation between the Soviet Union and its Western allies and the beginning of the Cold War.
Since 1945, and particularly during the Cold War, the Yalta agreements have been criticized in hindsight, particularly in the United States. President Roosevelt, who died just two months after the conference, was accused by some of handing Over Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe to Stalin and of allowing the Soviet Union to establish itself in the Far East against the promise of Russian intervention in the war against Japan.